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Abstract
We consider the privacy of interactions between individuals in a network. For many networks,
while nodes are anonymous to outside observers, the existence of a link between individuals implies
the possibility of one node revealing identifying information about its neighbor. Moreover, while the
identities of the accounts are likely hidden to an observer, the network of interaction between two
anonymous accounts is often available. For example, in blockchain cryptocurrencies, transactions
between two anonymous accounts are published openly. Here we consider what happens if one
(or more) parties in such a network are deanonymized by an outside identity. These compromised
individuals could leak information about others with whom they interacted, which could then
cascade to more and more nodes’ information being revealed. We use a percolation framework
to analyze the scenario outlined above and show for different likelihoods of individuals possessing
information on their counter-parties, the fraction of accounts that can be identified and the idealized
minimum number of steps from a deanonymized node to an anonymous node (a measure of the
effort required to deanonymize that individual). We further develop a greedy algorithm to estimate
the actual number of steps that will be needed to identify a particular node based on the noisy
information available to the attacker. We apply our framework to three real-world networks:
(1) a blockchain transaction network, (2) a network of interactions on the dark web, and (3) a
political conspiracy network. We find that in all three networks, beginning from one compromised
individual, it is possible to deanonymize a significant fraction of the network (> 50%) within less
than 5 steps. Overall these results provide guidelines for investigators seeking to identify actors in
anonymous networks, as well as for users seeking to maintain their privacy.
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The rise of privacy concerns in modern society has led to an increased interest in possible
methods for individuals to interact while preserving their anonymity [1–7]. These individual
interactions form a network between different parties and in many cases, while the anonymity
and privacy of an individual node is preserved, the global structure of the network may be
visible to others [8]. Often times the very act of interacting via a network link will involve
the two individuals at the ends of the link exchanging information that allows them to
identify one another [9]. Thus, if one individual is identified, it may (with some probability)
be possible to obtain information on some of her connections in the network [10].
For example, if a physical item is purchased via an anonymous transaction network
e.g., Blockchain cryptocurrencies [11], then the buyer must provide a shipping address to
receive the item and thus reveals some aspect of their location. Likewise, if two individuals
communicate via phone, then it is likely that they possess some knowledge of the person on
the other end of the call. Finally, in the case of online interactions, if user A’s computer is
hacked then A’s identity will become known to the hacker. The hacker could then search
for additional information on A’s computer e.g., email correspondence or private messages
through online forums, to learn the identities of other individuals who interacted with A.
After doing so, the hacker could then attempt to hack into these individuals computers (e.g.,
via a Trojan horse email) and with some probability, successfully traverse the network. The
very fact that A was hacked could also be useful in hacking the neighbors of A as individuals
are more likely to trust emails (that might contain a hidden Trojan) from known sources [12].
Similarly, in the context of criminal, terrorist or conspiracy networks, if a set of individuals
interact via anonymous communications if one member of the group is identified, they could
potentially be monitored or interrogated leading to the revelation of information on other
individuals, who could then also be monitored to identify other members of the network,
and so on. Specific examples would include users of burner phones who do not provide their
names, but whose calls can be tracked; anonymous email accounts where a name is not
provided, but a user’s messages may be saved by the email provider; Telegram Messenger,
where anonymous users may interact in public groups; and other criminal or conspiracy
networks.
Here we show that the question of anonymity between network actors, and the corre-
sponding ability of a party seeking to deanonymize the individuals based on information
from their neighbors, can be solved using tools and methods of percolation from statisti-
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cal physics [13–16]. Furthermore, we demonstrate that classical quantities from statistical
physics have important meanings and provide crucial information on the scope to which
anonymity can be maintained among individuals in real hidden networks.
We focus on three example networks: (1) transactions through blockchain-based cryp-
tocurrencies [17], (2) interactions related to illegal activities via the dark web [18], and (3) a
political conspiracy network [19]. In all three of these networks, the question of anonymity
is very important- as cryptocurrencies and the dark-web are often used by criminal orga-
nizations, [20–23] whereas conspirators depend on not being uncovered in order to avoid
criticism and possible criminal charges.
While some approaches have considered deanonymizing the individuals behind nodes in
a network [20], these have typically related to specific encrypted protocols and users have
found ways to overcome these issues. In contrast, our approach is fundamental to the nature
of privacy when interacting in a network i.e., when interacting with another party, a user
often must reveal some identifying information. Using our general framework demonstrated
in Fig 1 and based on the topologies of three real hidden networks, we are able to quantify
the extent to which this information can be exploited and thus reveal how individuals can
be unwittingly identified by their neighbors who failed to remain anonymous.
RESULTS
As explained above, we seek to understand how investigators could leverage information
exchanged between interacting parties in order to identify them. Nonetheless, in some cases,
an individual may not have any identifiable information about the party at the other end
of the transaction. In this sense, one could consider such a link ‘failed’ in the sense that no
deanonymization can be carried out via that link. Thus, the fraction of links exchanging
identifying information can be mapped to the link-occupation probability p from percolation,
such that p fraction of links exchanged identifying information. Traditionally, in percolation
frameworks the key quantity of interest is then the fractional size of the giant connected
component S. In the context of anonymity, if a single node in the giant component is
deanonymized, then the entire giant component could be discovered (within some time) via
individuals revealing information about their neighbors.
Similarly, for the other components, we can state that each component is a set of nodes
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FIG. 1: Giant Component and deanonymization. The initial network (A) where no users are
known. In (B) after investigators successfully identify node a, this node is marked green meaning it
is known and investigators can then use information from node a to traverse the network. Initially
all links are not known thus marked red. Green links represent links that have been de-anonymized.
In (C) the identity of node b is identified through information obtained via a link to node a. Then,
in (D), information from node b provides a link to node c, who is also identified in subplot (E).
Finally, node c provides information resulting in the identification of node d in subplot (F).
where if any one of these is deanonymized, then the rest of the set could also be identi-
fied. Therefore the total number of components, ncomp, represents the minimal number of
source nodes (in distinct components) that need to be identified independently in order to
deanonymize the entire network. Similarly if one has a set of source nodes n1,2,... each in a
different component, then the total number of nodes that can be identified is the sum of the
sizes of all of those separate components TS = |S1| + |S2| + ... + |Sn|, where TS is the total
number of nodes that can be identified (see SI- Distribution of Component Sizes).
Also of significant importance for privacy is the actual number of interrogations that
an investigator must carry out in order to deanonymize a specific target node, given that
the investigators know the identity of some given source nodes. For example, perhaps
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Parameter Percolation Theory Definition Interpretation
p; p = 1− q Fraction of occupied links Fraction of links where nodes can identify one another
S Giant connected component (GCC) Largest group of mutually vulnerable nodes
SG Second largest connected component Second largest group of mutually vulnerable nodes
ncomp Number of Components Min. num. of source nodes to identify whole network
` Shortest Path Length Optimal number of interrogations
`actual Greedy Algorithm Path Length Realistic number of interrogations
TABLE I: Mapping to percolation. We demonstrate and provide brief explanations on the various
measures used and how they relate to the traditional measures from percolation theory.
investigators identify one dark web user posting large amounts of child pornography or a
specific account participating in suspicious transactions on the Blockchain. The investigators
could begin by seeking information from their source individual on her neighbors and then
move on to the neighbors’ neighbors and so on, until reaching the desired node of interest.
This minimum number of individuals that must be identified to reach the desired node is the
shortest path length, `, from the source node/s to the target node and it represents a measure
of effort the investigators must expend since each individual that must be identified along
the path will require dedication of resources.. Lastly, we propose a new measure related
to the fact that while the investigators presumably know that some individuals will not
have identifying information on all of their neighbors, they do not know in advance which
links will be helpful. Therefore, we propose a greedy algorithm, described later, where the
investigators first interrogate the nodes along the initial shortest path from their source
node/s to the target and then update to a new path if the investigation reaches a dead end;
i.e. a link where the node on the other end cannot be identified. We define the number
of steps along the path using our greedy algorithm as `actual as it approximates what could
be taken as a possible ‘actual’ number of steps needed to reach a specific node given that
investigators do not know which links are useful. These and other relevant measures from
percolation theory are described in Table I.
We apply the framework described above to three publicly available hidden networks: (i)
the flow of funds within the Ethereum blockchain-based cryptocurrency [17], which is the
second largest cryptocurrency by market cap; (ii) A forum of users participating in sharing
v
Metric/Network Blockchain Dark Web Conspiracy
N 2,291,941 10,407 404
V 5,262,468 820,272 3350
< k > 2.8 150 9.7
c 0.21 0.83 0.85
< ` > 4∗ 2.15 2.98
Density 10−6 0.0076 0.022
TABLE II: Data used and basic real-world network characteristics. N is the number of nodes, V
is the number of links, < k > is the average degree, c is the clustering coefficient, < ` > is the
average shortest path length (which for the Blockchain network could only be estimated due to the
network dimensions), and density is the overall density of links defined by the number of links in
the network divided by the number of all possible links.
∗ Median is listed rather than mean due to long tail.
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FIG. 2: Largest and Second Largest Component. We show the fractional size of the largest,
S, and second largest SG, components in each of our three real networks. The points shown are
averages of 100 realizations and the error bars represent one standard deviation. For S the error
bars are smaller than the size of the markers. We see that the second largest component is generally
quite small (right y-axis) compared to the largest component and thus the largest component is
most important for deanonymization.
of child pornography on the dark web [18]; and (iii) A network of political conspirators in
Brazil [19]. Summary statistics on these datasets are available in Table II.
Using our percolation approach we analyze the sizes of the largest component in our
three real-world networks. This corresponds to the mean number of accounts that can be
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deanonymized after a single source node is identified. In Fig 2, we show the fractional size
of the giant connected component, S, and the second largest connected component, SG,
for each of our networks. We see that the second largest component is typically quite small
(0.07 at max for the Conspiracy network) in comparison to the largest component whereas S
typically constitutes a large fraction of the network. Also we can see that as the probability
of deanonymize p, increases the giant component increases and the second giant component
passes through a peak. The fact that only near p → 0 does S → 0 is typical of networks
with long-tail degree distributions, which is true for our 3 networks here (See Fig. A.1).
Overall, these results imply that the key deanonymization efforts should focus on the giant
component, and suggest that our approach is highly feasible in terms of deanonymizing a
large fraction of accounts since only a single source node is needed, and then all the nodes
in S are potentially identifiable.
Aside from the possibility of identifying individuals, there is also a question of the amount
of resources that must be dedicated in order to do so. Therefore an important aspect of our
proposed method is the minimum number of other intermediate individuals that the inves-
tigators must identify on the way towards identifying a specific target node. Each identified
individual requires considerable effort such as surveillance, hacking efforts, interrogations,
etc. This number of intermediate steps will inherently depend on the initial source node
where the investigators begin their search and on the topology of the network. In terms of
percolation theory quantities, it is related to the shortest path length from the source node
to a given target node. To capture an overall picture of the necessary effort, in Fig. 3 we
show the cumulative distribution (CDF) of the fraction of nodes that can be found within `
steps for different values of p, and for each of the three networks that are analyzed. We note
that for the Dark Web network we explore several very small values of p because interactions
on a forum in the Dark Web are less likely to involve individuals having information on one
another than in the case of transferring money or cooperating in a conspiracy. The CDF
essentially demonstrates for any possible source and target node the range of possible levels
of effort needed.
We note that in the case of the Blockchain Transaction Network, rather than considering
shortest paths between all pairs of nodes, we begin with a set of known nodes that are
so-called ‘exchanges,’ which convert between cryptocurrency and fiat currency. This choice
was made because exchanges inherently know the identities of their neighbors due to legal
vii
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FIG. 3: Size within shortest path length (ideal paths). We plot the number of nodes that can
be reached within ` steps (shortest path) for each of our networks. For the Blockchain Transaction
Network we assume that the set of all exchange nodes are sources, whereas for the Dark Web
Network and the Conspiracy Network, we randomly select source nodes. We see that for all 3 of
our networks, the ideal shortest paths are very short, with most reachable nodes, being reached
within ` ≈ 3 or ≈ 4 steps. Note that values of p ≤ 0.1 are shown only for the Dark Web.
policies they have in place to prevent money laundering [24]. Moreover, exchanges are the
hubs of the Blockchain Transaction Network [17] and thus serve as most likely initial targets
for investigators (for more on this choice, see SI). In contrast, for the Dark Web Network
and the Conspiracy Network, there is no initial reason to suspect that any particular node
is more likely to serve as an initial source. We see that in all three of our networks the
optimal shortest paths are typically within ` = 3 or ` = 4 steps, meaning that the network
can be considered a ‘small-world’ [25] with most nodes being within an identification range
of a fairly small number of interrogations.
However, the shortest path length is only the minimal number of interrogations an in-
vestigator would need if they had perfect knowledge in advance about which interactions
involved identifiable information. On a practical level, the investigator will be confronted
with the ‘noise’ of links that occurred between individuals but did not involve identifying
information. Therefore, we propose a naive greedy algorithm (Algorithm 1) that investiga-
tors could use in order to carry out their investigation. Essentially, our greedy algorithm
calculates the shortest path between the source node/s and the target. The investigators
then interrogate the nodes along the shortest path until they hit a dead end i.e., reach a
node that cannot communicate identifying information about the desired neighbor. They
then remove that link from the network, calculate the new shortest path to the target node
in the modified network, and attempt to traverse the new shortest path. This process can be
viii
FIG. 4: Targeting a specific node. Here we demonstrate our greedy algorithm for deanonymizing
a specific node T , given that we know the identity of two source nodes S1 and S2. In (a) we find
the shortest path from our source nodes which is S1 → I1 → T (links of the shortest path with
unknown identities outlined in purple) and interrogate the first node I1, on this shortest path, for
information. (b) After successfully identifying of node I1, we reach a dead end as the node I1
does not provide information on the target node T . We then again calculate the shortest path to
the target T and find an alternative path from source S2 → I2 → I3 → T (again with its links to
unknown nodes highlighted in purple). (c) We interrogate the first and second nodes on the path;
I2 and then I3 (outlined in purple again), who each successfully provide information, ultimately
leading us to the target. Note that while the optimal path would have interrogated only ` = 2
nodes, the actual path uses `actual = 3 nodes.
done iteratively until the target node is reached or until it is known that no other possible
paths exist. We note that this algorithm is not necessarily optimal, but on the contrary,
provides a simplistic upper bound on the effort needed.
In Algorithm 1 we formally present our greedy algorithm and in Fig. 4 we demonstrate
the process of our algorithm visually. If all of the links on the original shortest path are
indeed identifiable then our algorithm will lead to the minimal number of interrogations. In
contrast, if we hit dead ends along the paths we pursue, then our algorithm will lead to a
greater number of interrogations than optimal.
We next apply our greedy algorithm to our three datasets. As before, for the Blockchain
Transaction Network, we consider all of the exchange nodes as our source nodes (with all of
their links known), whereas for the Dark Web Network and Conspiracy Network we choose
source nodes randomly (and do not assume them to necessarily have any prior knowledge of
all neighbors). We then choose 100 random target nodes and assess how many actual steps
ix
ALGORITHM 1: Greedy Algorithm to Identify Target Node
Given graph G, set of source nodes S, target node T .
interrogations=0
while target node not reached do
Calculate shortest path SPT
for link in SPT do
if link identifiable then
interrogations+=1
end if
if link unidentifiable then
path=failed
link identifiable[link]=false
end if
if target node reached then
path=succeeded
total interogations=interrogations
end if
end for
end while
are required to reach them for different values of p. In order to understand the network
effects, we focus on identifying nodes that are at least ` = 2 steps away from a source node.
In Fig. 5 we show the CDF of how many nodes are reached within `actual steps using
our greedy algorithm and compare it to the number of nodes reached if the actual shortest
path, ` were known. We find that the investigators’ lack of knowledge about which links
involve exchange of identifiable information is a significant detriment to their ability to
optimally traverse the network for low values of p. For higher levels of p, the detriment is
less pronounced as most of the links will actually involve identifiable information and thus
attempting to traverse the shortest path will often succeed.
This detriment is further observed when we consider an investigators likelihood of success
from continuing to investigate additional individuals. In other words, given that an inves-
x
1 5 10 15 20
actual
0.0
0.5
1.0
CD
F
Blockchain
1 5 10 15 20
actual
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
CD
F
Dark Web
1 5 10 15 20
actual
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
CD
F Conspiracy Network
 
p = 1.0
p = 0.8
p = 0.6
p = 0.4
p = 0.2
p = 0.1
p = 0.05
p = 0.02
FIG. 5: Targeting a specific node results. We consider only nodes that are at least ` = 2
steps away and apply our greedy algorithm (Alg. 1) to deanonymize them given knowledge of a
particular source node. Filled lines represent the results of our algorithm, whereas dashed lines
represent the optimal number of nodes reached by an investigator with complete knowledge of the
underlying network. We show the results for different values of p in each network, with values of
p ≤ 0.1 shown only for the Dark Web. We see that for all 3 of our networks, for high levels of p
our algorithm is very close to the optimal path (since most links involve exchange of identifiable
information), whereas for lower values of p far more nodes can be reached using optimal choices
than our algorithm attains. For these low levels of p, incorporating additional metadata could
improve investigators’ ability to deanonymize particular nodes. Results are from at least 20,000
simulated source and target pairs (for each value of p).
tigator has investigated k individuals, what is the likelihood that continuing to investigate
the k + 1st individual (and so on if necessary) will lead to identifying the desired target?
In Fig. 6 we show this likelihood for differing levels of p. We see that for the Blockchain
network, until ≈ 5 investigations, the likelihood of continuing to investigate is worthwhile,
while after that, the probability of ultimate success decreases. Also, it is worth noting that
for p = 0.8, the success rate actually drops faster than for lower p. This is because for higher
p, more individuals will be identified thus leading investigators to believe that they still may
succeed, while for lower p they will more quickly determine that the target is not identifiable
(that is, the target is outside the giant component). For the other networks, we see that
the value in continuing to investigate depends on p, as for high p, the likelihood of success
continues to be significant, while for lower p it drops fairly quickly.
We note that our greedy algorithm does not use any metadata that may be associated
with the links, which could improve an investigators ability to guess which links involved
exchange of identifiable information. For example, one could look at the frequency that the
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FIG. 6: Likelihood of future success. Here we show for all three of our networks the likelihood
that continuing to search after `actual steps will lead to a successful identification of a given target
node. In particular for the Blockchain network, we see that for p = 0.8 there is sharp decrease in
the value of continued searching part around `actual ≈ 6 steps. For the other networks, we observe
high probabilities of success except for p = 0.2 where the chance of finding a target note, P(find),
decreases steadily. Note that for larger values of `actual there are very small sample sizes leading
to higher fluctuations. Likewise, for some values of p the lines end before `actual = 25, because all
nodes are either found or known to be unreachable before 25 steps.
different links appear e.g. how often transactions are made or how often two individuals
communicate, and thus improve the success rate. Incorporating such information into a
scoring system for the links could lead to improved values of `actual.
DISCUSSION
We have demonstrated the fundamental mapping between percolation and privacy. Our
framework can be used to understand networks where the actors (nodes) interact anony-
mously. Nonetheless, within the links (or at least within some of them) there often exists
exchange of information that could allow for deanonmyization. This naturally leads to our
percolation mapping with corresponding interpretations for the size of the giant component,
number of components, and shortest path lengths. We observed an existence of hubs in all
three of our networks, which is a topological structure that is common in many networks.
Importantly, we note that the existence of hubs exacerbates privacy issues as hubs can be po-
tentially identified via their many spokes and then can reveal information on the remainder
of the network. This is particularly true in the case of the Blockchain Transaction network
where the hubs are exchanges which are known to collect information on their neighbors.
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We further developed a greedy algorithm to account for the fact that the shortest path
is not easily discovered and pursuing what appears to be the shortest path can often lead to
a dead end. Thus, our greedy algorithm demonstrates the feasibility of actually effort that
is required for discovering the identity of a chosen target node. Overall, our results provide
a framework for investigators to approach deanonymization and consider their likelihood of
success and required effort in order to deanonymize a particular node in the network or a
given desired fraction of the entire hidden network.
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
Data
We collected our data from 3 public datasets corresponding to the cryptocurrency
Ethereum [17], a network of interactions on the dark web [18], and a political conspiracy
network [19].
For the Ethereum network, we note that we specifically looked at what is referred to as
the Money Flow Graph (MFG), which corresponds to the flow of funds through the network.
Ethereum due to its design can also have nodes that are not related to the flow of money.
We ignore these nodes and interactions between them since if no money is involved it is less
likely that the ends of the two nodes will have identifiable information on one another. In
the particular case of Ethereum in fact, many of these nodes are presumably ‘functions’ that
were written by a single developer but are perhaps used by many others.
We use the Dark Web network as provided by the authors [18].
For the Conspiracy Network [19], we reduce the initial network to only include the GCC
since the provided data involves actors in several conspiracy plots, some of which are not
related to one another and thus represent distinct networks.
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FIG. A.1: Degree Distributions. We show the degree distributions of our 3 networks. We see
that all have degrees varying over several orders of magnitude. Recall that the Conspiracy and
Dark Web networks are smaller and thus have a shorter tail.
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Distribution of Component Sizes
An interesting point mentioned briefly in the main text, is that should a network consist
of distinct components, an investigator would simply need a source node in each component
in order to traverse the network and identify individuals. The Dark Web Network and Con-
spiracy Network are too small for us to observe a distribution of component sizes, however
for the Blockchain Network, we show in Fig. A.2 several graphs related to component sizes.
First we show the distribution of small components (Fig. A.2a), which we see rapidly de-
creases with very few components above 10 nodes. We also show (Fig. A.2b), the number
of components in the network for different values of p, which even for low values of p, may
be many. However, many of these separate components are actually just a single isolated
node, so their identification is difficult. To make this point clearer we show in Fig. A.2c
the fraction of nodes reached given that a varying number of components are identified.
It is noteworthy that adding additional components has a minimal effect beyond the giant
component until the number of components essentially covers all of the isolated nodes as
well.
Exchanges in the Blockchain Network
Our results in Fig. 2 suggested that all of our networks contains hubs. However, in the
case of blockchain-based cryptocurrencies, these hubs are of a unique nature as prior work
has noted that these hubs tend to be ‘exchanges’ where one can convert cryptocurrency into
ordinary fiat currencies [17]. The exchanges have many more transactions than a typical
consumer as they essentially serve as gatekeepers for their respective currencies. More
importantly, nearly all of these exchanges now have know-your-customer (KYC) policies
wherein they require passport information and other identifying information about their
consumers [24]. This means that transactions with an exchange inherently involve sharing
identifiable information.
To include the knowledge of exchanges in our percolation framework, we assumed that all
exchange links involve identifiable information (due to KYC policies) and then assumed that
p fraction of the remaining transactions also involve sharing identifiable information. This
framework was used throughout the main text when relating to the Blockchain Network.
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FIG. A.2: Connected Components. For deanonymization, an entire connected component is
vulnerable if at least one if its nodes is deanonymized (as this node could then provide information
on its neighbors and so on as in Fig. 1). Thus the number of components corresponds to the
minimum number of deanonymized ‘seed’ nodes in order for the entire network to be deanonymized.
(a) Here we show the distribution of small components i.e., all components excluding the giant
component as a function of p. We observe multiple scales of component sizes, however we do not
observe power-law scaling for any values of p. (b) Here we show the total number of components
(including isolated nodes as individual components) as a function of p. As p decreases more nodes
become isolated leading to a greater number of components. In the inset we show an example of 4
disconnected components, noting that the isolated node also counts as a component. (c) Here we
show the total fraction of nodes reached after summing the n largest components. We see that the
total fraction of nodes reached starts at the size of the GCC and slowly increases. Note that the
x-axis is log-scale thus, very large numbers of components are needed to reach beyond the GCC.
Nonetheless, to expand on the results of the main text, we also include here the case where
an investigator obtains information from only one of the exchanges i.e., Bittrex, Changelly,
Kraken, Poloniex, or Shapeshift. We show both the sizes of the giant component and the
CDF of the path lengths for each individual exchange in Fig. A.3.
We note that for the remaining networks (Dark Web and Conspiracy), we randomly
selected a source node and did not assume that it necessarily knew the identities of its
neighbors.
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FIG. A.3: Knowledge of links from only one individual exchange in the Blcockchain
Network. In the upper left we show the size of the giant component for the case where only links
from an individual exchange (Bittrex, Changelly, Kraken, Poloniex, or Shapeshift are known) are
guaranteed to be known. We see that knowing the links of Shapeshift has the largest effect for
low values of p, but having knowledge from the other exchanges still leads to improvement as seen
by the increase in S for All exchanges. In the remaining five subplots we show the cumulative
distribution (CDF) of nodes reached from an individual exchange node within l steps. This is
similar to Fig. 3 for the Blockchain Network, where all exchanges were assumed to be known, but
here only the specific exchange in the label of the figure is known. We show for different values of
p, what fraction of nodes are reached within l steps.
Actual Path lengths
Here we present the probability distribution function (PDF) corresponding the CDF
shown in Fig. 5.
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FIG. A.4: PDF of `actual Here we show the distribution of `actual that corresponds to the CDF
shown in Fig. 5 of the main text. We observe a bell shaped curve with a peak around `actual ≈ 3
for all of our networks.
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